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PHILOSOPHY FOR CHILDREN AND THE RECONSTRUCTION
OF PHILOSOPHY
DAVID KENNEDY

ABSTRACT:

In this paper I trace the dialogical and narrative dimensions of th
philosophical tradition and explore how they are reconfigured in the noti
community of philosophical inquiry (CPI), the mainstay of the collection of
and discussion plans known as Philosophy for Children. After considerin
ontology and epistemology of dialogue, I argue that narrative has replaced
sition in our understanding of philosophical discourse and that CPI repres
narrative context in which truth comes to represent the best story, in a disc
location in which there are always multiple stories. Finally, I raise the issue
dren's philosophical voice. Can children philosophize, and if they can, do th
so in a voice different from adults'? If so, what are the distinctive features o
voice? I assert that it is children's historical marginalization in the Wes
construction of rationality that now - as that rationality undergoes its c
makes of them, like women and other "natives," privileged strangers to the
tion, who are, through CPI, enabled to enter it through dialogue and narrati

Keywords: community of inquiry, dialogue, narrative, philosophy for childr

It is an ironic and compelling curiosity of Philosophy for Children1 th

implications for the theory and practice of philosophy are so much

significant than might be expected of an educational program designed

schoolchildren. What could a series of somewhat pedestrian ju

novels, each combined with a manual brimming with unsequenced

cises and discussion plans, say to the historical moment of Western ph
ophy in the larger sense? It may seem an absurd claim that this appare

simple educational tool could lead us to reconsider some fundame

notions about the nature, activity, and use of the tradition as a whole.
I want to suggest that what has been invented/discovered in Philosoph

Children models a way of conceptualizing and doing philosophy w

1 Matthew Lipman inaugurated the Philosophy for Children program in 1969 with
Stottlemeir's Discovery - the first philosophical novel in a series which now includes
each of which is accompanied by a manual including discussion exercises and activi
conceptual explanations. The program covers grades K-12 and is implemented inte
ally. Teacher training and curriculum development are conducted at the Institute
Advancement of Philosophy for Children (IAPC) at Montclair State University, New J
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although it has been implicit in the tradition from the beginning, has

been explored except tacitly and episodically. The areas in which

Philosophy for Children represents both an innovation and a fulfillment of
themes already present in the tradition fall broadly under the concepts of
dialogue and narrative. The former is particularly important, as it forms

the basis of the program's methodology, known as community of philo
sophical inquiry (CPI). The experience of the communal dialogue which is
the grounding practice of CPI brings us face to face with the original
condition of philosophy: philosophy not just as conversation, but as an
emergent, multivocal, and interactive story about the world and about
persons thinking about the world. More than any traditional deconstruction

of the tradition, CPI subverts the onto-theological discourse model upon
which philosophy has traded since Aristotle, if not Plato.
The aim of the following inquiry is to explore the dialogical and narrative
roots of the philosophical enterprise and to explore how they are reconfig
ured in CPI. This will involve thinking about the ontology and epistemology

of dialogue, how dialogue is expressed in the philosophical tradition, and
how it operates in CPI. The inquiry then moves to a consideration of how

narrative has replaced exposition in our understanding of philosophical
discourse, and how CPI represents an embodied narrative context in which
truth comes to represent the best story, in a discursive location in which there

are always multiple stories. Finally, the issue of children's philosophical
voice is raised: Can children philosophize? If they can, is it in a different
voice than adults? If so, what are the distinctive features of that voice? I want

to claim that it is children's historical marginalization in the Western
construction of rationality which, now - as that rationality undergoes its
crisis - makes of them, like women and other "natives," privileged strangers
to the tradition. Like all voices from the margins, theirs are prophetic in
regard to the tradition, which, as it opens itself to hear them, is transformed.

Dialogue and Alterity
The theory and practice of dialogue itself have received increasing atten
tion in this century, from Buber to Levinas, to Gadamer, to Schilder,
Bakhtin, and Habermas. Buber made the first direct exploration of the
ontology of dialogue and showed it to be a fundamental interhuman
phenomenon. For him, dialogue is not just a form of discourse - or, rather,

it is discursive to the extent that the structure of embodied existence is

discursive. Dialogue emerges in the "between" among persons, a space of
play, difference, liminality,2 and transcendence, in which boundaries are, if
2 "Liminality" is from the Latin word limen, meaning "threshold." It was adopted as a
psychological term in the early nineteenth century to refer to the limit below which a given
sensation ceases to be perceptible. It has been used in the late twentieth century by anthro
pologists, philosophers, and literary critics to evoke the ambiguity of boundaries - whether
intra- or interpsychological, cultural, or discursive.

© Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1999

This content downloaded from
130.68.251.199 on Wed, 22 Jun 2022 16:00:10 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

340

DAVID KENNEDY

not renounced, then put at risk. The moment of the putting-in-quest

boundaries is the moment in which the dialogical structure of b
emerges most clearly and opens a space of transformative poten
Through its interplay, boundaries are continually being reconfigured

just conceptual boundaries, but intersubjective and social ones as
There is no such thing as just a dialogue of ideas.

Dialogue characterizes CPI so completely because it emerge

discursive location in which all propositions are already in quest
Dialogue is not a taking of positions, but a mutual positioning wi
space of interrogation which is characterized by self-othering, or
encing self as an other. In dialogue, we enter into the experience o
difference - we no longer operate from the position of the boun

thematizing subject. In dialogue there is a decentering of the transcen
tal ego. As such, it is a hermeneutical experience, for the operational

of hermeneutics, as Hugh Silverman (1986) points out, is bet

"between subject and object, ground and non-ground, thinker and tho

speaker and spoken about, knower and that which is to be known"
Buber's (1970) most important contribution to a theory of dialogue
have been to show us what it is not and to point out its structural vu
bility to being undermined by objectification, or what he called the "
form of intersubjectivity. In fact, we would not have the experience
concept of dialogue without its absence; both are woven into the
human experience. Dialogue offers the possibility of a transitio
condition of unity which in its very structure it yet denies, for it e
only after a prior transition from unity into difference. It is a doub
ment, always in motion toward a recovered unity, but never arr
Gadamer (1976) characterizes it as "a traveling apart toward unity
movement in which the whole is always implicit, and yet movement
spires through division and differentiation.3
Although Buber's interpretation allows and perhaps even sets th
for the dialectical movement that Gadamer is mainly concerned to ex
his ontology posits a duality at the heart of existence; and dialo
although it is all we have to overcome that duality, can never do mor
express it. Buber does invoke "the original relational character
appearance of all beings" - yet that originary condition is set just
of time, for objectification is implicit the moment either the "pr
mind" or the child has recognized itself as an "I." "The sublime
choly of our lot," he says, is that

every You must become an It in our world. Every you in the world is
by its nature to become a thing or at least to enter into thinghood ag
again. .. . The It is the chrysalis, the You the butterfly. Only it is not al
if these states took turns so neatly; often it is an intricately entangled s
events that is tortuously dual. (1970, 71, 68-69)

3 See Gadamer 1980, 1986. For a summary of his theory of dialogue, see Kennedy
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How this characterization of the movement of dialogue, which is b
on interaction between two individuals, can be extended to the idea of

group or communal dialogue is critical to CPI theory. Can the principles

and characteristics of one be applied directly to the other? Buber speaks of
"true community" as an outcome of dialogue,4 but community, for him,
becomes dialogical only when "all . . . stand in a living, reciprocal rela
tionship to a single living center, and they . . . stand in a living, reciprocal
relationship to each other. The second event has its source in the first but
is not immediately given with it." Community has its only ground in a felt
totality - spirit, God, the whole, "the You [which] appeared to man out of
a deeper mystery" - the relation to which makes the relation of each to
each possible (1970, 92).
There may be several analogues to this "single living center" in the
process and the event of CPI, but both of them escape Buber's ontological
framework. On an epistemological level, the notion of an all-encompass
ing but infinitely deferred "truth" provides a center, though it is one which
is never fully present except as a horizon. On the level of lived experience,

the interplay between unity and division, identity and difference, is as
present in group dialogue as in the dyadic form. The group itself can
become a You for each individual, transcendent and numinous - greater

than the sum of its parts. The experience of the community as a You is as
ephemeral as the dyadic; in fact, it is not an "experience" to the extent that

it is an event that, the moment it is "assigned as measure and boundary"
that is implicit in framing it as an experience, has entered the It world. But
in the constantly shifting modality of the two forms of relation, each visi

tation of the I-You leaves its traces in the I—It. Each experience of the
community as a You increases the expectation of its return and even the
expectation, however illusory, that it will some day come to stay.

The experience of what Buber calls the "living we," in that it is multi
rather than dialogical, must have characteristics which are distinct from
dyadic interaction. Within the community, any dialogical relation is set in
the larger context of multiple relations. Anything which I say to you is also
said to everyone, and yet anything said to the whole group is interpreted
differently by each individual. In CPI, my interaction with you is through
you to the whole group, and through the whole group to you, but those two
things are different. Furthermore, we are each of us carrying, not just the
emergent conceptual structure of our inquiry, but the gestural, the linguis
tic, the personal-political (i.e., personal and cultural power relations), the
4 "Wherever men regard each other in the mutuality of I and You; wherever one showed
the other something of the world in such a way that from then on he really began really to

perceive it; wherever one gave another a sign in such a way that he could recognize the
designated situation as he had not been able to before; wherever one communicated to the
other his own experience in such a way that it penetrated within, so that from now on his
perceptions were set within a world as they had not been before, . .. thus came to be and
thus is the living We" (Buber 1970, 94).
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affective, and the erotic.5 The individual and the communal are interca
lated; there is a permanent confusion of the one and the many, the part and

the whole.

If dialogue between two is about boundaries, liminality, and alterity,
then within multiple relations, this would become only more complex. At

the level of lived experience, Paul Schilder (1950) has referred to what he

called a "dialogue of body images." He speaks of "a constant 'uncon

scious' wandering of other personalities into ourselves, ... a continuous
movement of personalities, and of body-images towards our own body
image" (235, 273). With this formulation, we reach the level of intercor
poreal experience, or what Merleau-Ponty called "total language" - where
gesture, posture, gaze, and the kinesic style of each participant are or are

not in dialogue, a dialogue which is also a seeking of unity through the
path of alterity. Schilder refers at one point to the process as "a continual
testing to find out what parts fit the . . . whole" (286). But as in the ongo
ing conceptual structuration of CPI, that whole, although always implicit,
is never reached. This unfinished whole is the whole, or all that we have of
it.

Both Schilder and Merleau-Ponty (1973) help us to locate the area of
what the latter calls "collective participation," or that "current of undiffer
entiated psychic experience ... a state of permanent 'hysteria' (in the sense
of indistinctness between that which is lived and that which is only imag

ined between self and others)" (45-46). Both touch on the lived experience
of preverbal dialogue. It is this, as much as the ongoing negotiation of a
conceptual structure - a structure of judgments - which makes for the
significance of CPI. And it is the embodied character of this event-struc
ture which shifts the practice of philosophy, not just to a communal event,
but to a postliterate one - a shift which is as much a return as it is a step
beyond, for it represents a dialectical return to the oral/aural discourse
structure of the preliterate information environment, which is where all our
deep images of community come from.

Buber (1965) identifies some necessary elements of dialogue:
• first, an original situation of "distance and relation": "Distance provides
the human situation; relation provides man's becoming in that situation"

(64)
• then an acceptance - an affirmation even - of alterity: the recognition
that my "own relation to truth is heightened by the other's different rela
tion to the same truth" (69)

• an affirmation of the other exactly in her otherness, "for the person is
through and through nothing other than uniqueness and thus essentially
other than all that is over against it" (96)
5 For a parsing of these various dimensions of lived community of inquiry, see Kennedy

1994.
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Buber's affirmation of the other in the form of "acceptance and lo
if not sentimental, then set outside the range of the It-world - which
default-world - and thus by necessity a desultory affirmation. For L

(1987), who develops Buber's analysis in a dramatically differen

tion, affirmation can only follow a primary disruption of subjectivit
"rupture of the egoist-I and its reconditioning in the face of the Oth
am "infinitely responsible" before the Other, compelled by an existen
ethical imperative which both decenters the ego and "elects" it as "m

singularized, made responsible, not by itself but despite-itself' (1

Levinas, the Other comes before me, before the "very firstness of it

I's] being for itself." My situation vis-a-vis the Other is not so m

distance which goads me to, or even sets the stage for, the

encounter, but the ineluctable demand to "respond to the very alteri
the Other, an alterity which is always on the verge of presence but w

never comes to presence" (18). Dialogue begins with this situation

cal decentering of the ego and is thus by definition an ethical situati
categorical imperative. It makes for what Buber refers to as the "stak
the self' - an openness to being changed by the encounter with the O

Indeed, one is already changed the moment one has recogniz

demands of alterity, for one is always beholden, always positioned fo
which is "always on the verge of presence but which never comes to

ence" (18).
Dialogue could be said to be the discursive situation in which w

ourselves to this primary ethical situation of responsibility which Le
describes. In dialogue, we enter into a "perpetual dis-orientation" whi

"neither an opinion, a prejudice, a dogma, nor a truth, but the w
proper to ethical significance" (25). As such, it is something of a
space, the space where we encounter the transcendent in the con

coming-to-presence of the other. As such, it demands, according to B
(1965), that the interlocutors "keep nothing back," that each "must b
ing on each occasion to say what is really in his mind about the subje

the conversation" (112). But this saying is constrained by language

for no amount of saying what is really in my mind results in the sai
dialogue requires a sometimes painful acceptance of the unfinished, o

presence "which never comes to presence," an endless asymmetr

asynchronicity of signs, and a knowledge that language can never fin
reference anything except itself. The meaning which is arrived at th

dialogical speech is a meaning which may be there as a result of

locution, but as much in spite of interlocution - a meaning which is n

finally located because of speech's inherent deformations, or wh
continuously deferred through the inherent temporality of spee

Buber says, "within a dialogical event, there would still remain somet
that sui generis could not be included - and that is just what does not
itself to be understood as the sum of the speech of two or more spea

(112).
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Dialogue and Play

Both Buber's and Levinas's analyses of the dialogical situation ar

on the face-to-face of the human dyad. Neither of them requires ext

translation when applied to communal dialogue, but the multipli
relations that the latter involves implies more than a quantitativ
ence. It is in Gadamer's association of dialogue with play that a str
analysis emerges of the phenomenon which lends itself more dir

the theory of CPI. The multiple meanings of the word "play" are an
tage here, for in a sense communal philosophical inquiry satisfies the
In the larger, generic sense of the word, play is an event-structure w

carries the players beyond themselves - in which, in classic play
terms, the everyday life-world of instrumental, means-ends rela
overcome, and spontaneity, chance, and emergent combination p
This is possible because play is inherently noninstrumental: it is

players who act upon the world, but the world which acts through t
ers. The players are played by the play, or "game," which is to say th

released into the spontaneous emergence of a structure which is
any individual player (Gadamer 1975, 93-97). Through the interp
emergent relation between the whole and the parts builds toward

nitely receding horizon of cognitive/affective equilibrium, or coordi
of the perspectives of each participant. It is this final coordination -

Peirce (1958) calls the "truth," that is, what the community of in
will agree on "in the long run" - which appears to be infinitely d
(81-83). The game which is communal philosophical dialogue play
- it "happens" when people enter into reflective dialogue about ph

ical questions. Its product is a dynamic semiotic structure in which a
changing network of concepts, feelings, and judgments emerge chaot

into system, ever assuming and ever losing and reassuming an em
shape which, once attained, would end all dialogue, all play.6
Communal dialogue is also play in the sense of agon, or contest

involves the conflict and the struggle of ideas - a game in which the
cations of the playing field are the rules and principles of formal an

mal logic. It is also a play of representation, the way a theatric

represents the world, for play is a way of being in the world through
the world - of ideas, of lived human relationships, of personal and c
nal myths and narratives - presents itself through the players, who

case are authors, actors, and audience combined. As representatio
always dimensionally beyond what it is representing, and hence t
dent: play unfolds a metaworld in which the world, reproduced a

6 Whether there can be said to be dialogue in the nonhuman world 1 am n
although if Gadamer's description of being as always mediated through langua
sense, and we recognize the communicative substructure of language throughou
then maybe we could speak of nature as at dialogical play.
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revealed as a whole, as meaning. Gadamer refers to this as the "tra

mation into structure." He associates it with Platonic anamnesis and

Heideggerian aletheia and offers it as a model for hermeneutical experi
ence, in which understanding is experienced as recognition and discovery,
rather than unilateral subjective appropriation (1975, 102-3).

As Schilder, Merleau-Ponty, and the phenomenology of small-group
process help us understand, the play of communal dialogue operates at
levels of gesture, speech, and the music and prosody of discourse patterns,

beneath (or "within" or "before") the level of conceptual inquiry. To the
extent that it is made up of embodied beings, a community of persons in

dialogue is a natural community. Natural signs emerge and interplay
between interlocutors gesturally, kinesically, posturally, physiognomically

- a blush, an involuntary gesture or movement, a change in the tone of
voice. At another level, dialogue is implicit in the syntactical structure of
language itself. The structure of subjects and predicates implies the propo

sition, which in turn implies its contradiction, which in turn implies a
possible resolution of the two in a third proposition. Even in informal
discourse one proposition calls forth another, or at least an affirmative
judgment or problematizing response. Every question implies a response,
and every proposition a question to which it is a response. Whatever the
level of discourse-in-the-broad-sense - bodily kinesic, affective, linguistic,

or conceptual - the interplay of interlocutors is governed by certain
implicit normative rules of how and when, in what register to speak,
acceptable vocabularies, and so on.
It is at this level of discursive structure, or "speech situation," that the

critically important relationship between communal dialogue and demo

cratic practices and dispositions emerges. The ideal speech situation

excludes claims based on authority, tradition, force, charisma, or intellec

tual status (Habermas 1984, 42). Can this be posited as an ideal for CPI as
well? If so, how would it change the way we understand philosophy as a
Western practice? The institutional reproduction of the tradition seems not

to have put much emphasis on the notion of an ideal speech situation,
either as a practice or as a value, or on the principles of dialogue as essen
tial to philosophical inquiry. Rather, the emphasis has been placed on
agonistic rhetoric, associated more with war or politics than play. The shift
which Philosophy for Children and CPI imply has to do with re-presenting
philosophy as a praxis which is communal, multivocal, dialogical, imme
diate, oral/aural and grounded in lived experience and emergent meaning.
Philosophical Dialogue
The dialogical roots of Western philosophy are present in its earliest begin
nings. Heraclitus's (Wheelwright 1960) first formulation of logos suggests

interlocution, tension, and dialectic: the logos is common to all, and the
struggle of thinking is to resist the tendency to turn away to a "private
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world" or "private intelligence" of one's own (69). The logos "throw

and then brings together again; it advances and retires" (71

"Opposition brings concord. Out of discord comes the fairest har
(77). The pre-Socratics are also in dialogue with previous texts o
teachings. This is what Bakhtin (1981) identified as "the dialogic

tion of . . . any discourse ... the natural orientation of any

discourse" as a relation between utterances rather than persons (2

This is traditionally how we think of philosophical dialogue in the We

tradition - as a dialogue of texts. So Kant is responding to Hume
Aristotle, and Hume to Reed, who is responding to Berkeley, w
responding to Locke, who is responding to Descartes, and so on.
Socratic dialectic is a new departure, in that it is a representatio

some ambiguous degree an actual transcript - of conversational intera

between interlocutors. Ironically, it is available to us only because

rendered a text. Whatever its status as real conversation, Socratic dia

is what Burbules (1993) calls "teleological," that is, dialogue that a

a resolution that can be known in advance - the Truth to which the skilled

dialectician can lead his interlocutor. Burbules distinguishes this from
"nonteleological" dialogue, which lacks, he says, "the assumption that in
practice it will always lead its participants to common and indubitable
conclusions" (5). What lends Socratic dialogue its fascination is that in
spite of Plato's presumption to be conducting teleological dialogue, the
search for the truth always founders and fragments on an aporia, thus
demonstrating the impossibility of teleological dialogue.
Practitioners of CPI find themselves in the same predicament. To the
extent to which they base their epistemological expectations on Peirce's
(and Plato's) paradoxical dictum that there is a truth to be arrived at "in the

long run," so CPI practices teleological dialogue in the sense that it under
stands itself to be always traveling toward a final coordination of perspec
tives. But CPI is nonteleological to the extent that it does not assume that
the truth yet exists, or even if it does, that it can be known in any but the
most partial, fragmentary, and even distorted forms by any member of the

community - including any one powerful thinker like Socrates - at any
given time. It is teleological in that it holds that in philosophical dialogue,

there is such a thing as "following the inquiry where it leads," which

implies a direction and at least possibly a telos. It is nonteleological in that
this telos is out of our hands - it is a terminus which we cannot predict and
which we cannot even be ultimately certain exists. If we map the inquiry,
we find that at any given point it is in transition, that one "move" in the
dialogue can transform the whole picture. It is a chaotic structure, a contin

uously emergent, open system, whose direction can never be overdeter
mined. Freeze-framed at any given moment, it contains a multiplicity of
possible directions in which it could move forward, which depend to a
great extent on the individuals participating in the communal dialogue. The
path of dialogue is both found and constructed.
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The moves of the conversation are disciplined in their possible for
direction by the laws of identity and contradiction - at least for tho

accept these fundamental logical laws (there is, after all, a logic

discourses of the mad, or of dreams, or of the poetic imagination). T

of critical linguistic and semiotic functions which have developed

these laws - the tools of logic, or "critical thinking" skills - make up
tively stable infrastructure and act as a heuristic for action within t
Moves like calling for a definition, offering a counterexample, ident

a hidden assumption, offering and evaluating an analogy, and so

staples of philosophical discourse. But it is a characteristic of an eme
system - and of the experience of CPI practitioners - that the argum
tion-process of communal dialogue does not proceed in symmetrical f
but is characterized by leaps, recursions, and branching. Often it

cult to tell whether the makers of these "chaotic" moves do so t
some intuitive sense of the larger logic of the emergent system characteristics have been sketched by Peirce through such term
"abduction," "interpretive musement," "synechism," and "tychis

for reasons attributable to egocentrism or misunderstanding. Whatev
case, they can have the same effect of moving the argument forwar

Philosophy as communal dialogue is, then, an implicit but as ye

plored foundation of the Western tradition. As a language event, it r
philosophy to the agora, to its status as a public conversation, ground

the lived meanings of the participants and unfolding as narrative

than treatise. As a dialogical event, it rules out the voice of prior aut
either from the past in the form of a written text, or from one voice

the conversation itself - for dialogue is inherently nonhierarchi

demands, as Buber (1948) said, that each "expose himself wholly, in a
way, in his humanly unavoidable partiality, and thereby experience h
in a real way as limited by the other, so that the two suffer togethe

destiny of our conditioned nature, and meet one another in it"
inquiry rather than debate, persuasion, catechesis, or indoctrin

philosophy as communal dialogue problematizes the tradition, which l
to reconstruction of the tradition rather than its reproduction. Its mo
has its own law; its participants "follow the argument where it leads,

every move in the argument generates some new requiredness: "
instance a word demanding an answer has happened to me" (10). It
particular respect for the historical logic of the tradition, but is an o
event of reconstruction of elements whose only topos is the human m
ing-structure of the community of inquirers and its members.
In its re-presentation in CPI, philosophy is revealed as poetics, a ma
rather than a delivering of truth - an immediate expression rather th
fixing or transmission of meaning. In that it is emergent and interlo
it has the character of a story-in-the-making, a negotiated narrative

the world, each telling her story in its commonality with and its diffe
from each other story.
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Narrative

With the "crumbling of the foundations" of ontology and epistemology in
postmodern thought, narrative replaces exposition. We can never describe,
but only tell the story. Even "self' is understood as a story one tells to and

about oneself, and the notion of history as ineluctably locked in genre
fictionalizes it forever. Every discourse is a poetics, in the sense that it is a

making, an interpretive construct. Even science, which has inherited the
pretensions of onto-theological discourse, deconstructs itself on its own
instruments. The Archimedean point has turned out to be a vanishing point.
Not only does each story, to the extent that it is a story, imply the possibil
ity of another story, but even if there is one Story upon which all stumble,
it appears not to have a resolution.
To the extent that the Archimedean point is implicit in Kant's inaccessi
ble noumenal or Peirce's truth of "the long run," all the stories are flawed
accounts which will eventually find themselves to be telling the same story,
but the moment of their convergence is infinitely deferred. What makes CPI
interesting is that it is an event in which multiple stories come into dialogue
and confront each other's premises and assumptions, and in the process find
what they have in common. To an extent this makes the experience of CPI
the opposite of the experience through which Socrates puts us. In the latter
we start with the conviction that we will reason our way to the big Story,
but we end up foundering on the aporia; in the former, we start from the
experience of the incommensurability of stories and find ourselves partici
pating - albeit in Heraclitus's paradoxical chiasm, whereby "From out of all
the many particulars comes oneness, and out of oneness come all the many

particulars" (Wheelwright 1960, 78) - in a common story.
More important for the present moment in the history of philosophy is
the effect of Philosophy for Children's approach to the tradition. In CPI as
constructed by Lipman and Sharp, the history of philosophy is not so much
deconstructed as disassembled and submerged in stories of the ordinary,
lived world. For example, in the novel Pixie (Lipman 1981) the heroine
wakes up with her arm asleep and muses on her relation to her body:
Have you ever had your arm go to sleep? Isn't it weird? It's like it doesn't even
belong to you! How could part of you not belong to you? All of you belongs to
you! But you see, that's what puzzles me. Either my body and I are the same
or they're not the same. If my body and I are the same, then it can't belong to
me. And if my body and I are different, then who am /? . . . Afterwards, when
I talked to Isabel about it, she said, "Pixie, you worry too much. Look, there's

really no problem. Your body belongs to you and you belong to your body."
"Sure," I said, "but do I belong to my body in the same way that my body
belongs to me?" (5-6)

In Lipman's novels, the tradition is disassembled as onto-theological
discourse and redistributed into the narrative world of human everyday
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experience - not as arguments, positions, or systems, but as the
mental questions which led to the articulation of those systems
first place. They are the questions which many children ask, im
or explicitly, and which some consider to be the childhood basi

mature philosophical wonder (Matthews 1980). The Philosop

Children stories reposition these questions in everyday conscio
They act as stimulus texts for CPI; when they are read commu
they lead to further questions, which form the thematic agend

discussion.

With their entry into communal dialogue, the historical discourse
which these questions evoke undergoes a process of spontaneous recon
struction: familiar positions emerge, along with familiar arguments. The
same attempt to build system which has driven individual philosophers
now operates communally, but no longer monologically; hence system,
fixed position, and conclusive argument never succeed, but are in contin
ual emergence - sabotaged by the multiplicity of perspectives - while that
very multiplicity creates new possibilities for the systematic interrelation
of perspectives. The distributive play of dialogue, with its two disciplines
- alterity (the demand for response implicit in the presence of the other)

and logic (both the logic of larger discourse-patterns and the logic

grounded in language) - re-presents the tradition, as in a play, or a game,

or an agon. Pieces of the tradition begin to emerge inchoately in the
dialogue, like a lost continent emerging from the ocean. It is "lost" but
new, both discovered and invented, disembarrassed of the implicit total
ism which it had come to represent. Philosophical discourse meets lived
experience and communal experience in such a way that in CPI we are
always doing "first" philosophy. System continually founders on alterity

and on logical contradiction, yet system is always building, always

attempting itself. As a chaotic system, it is always in movement, with
whatever apparent randomness, toward final closure; but total closure is
entropy, the closing of the system, the truth which is the end of truth
because it is no longer in contradistinction to not-truth, and so is its own

completion.

CPI is so structured that it never will allow final closure, because of the
stubborn perdurance of the multiplicity of individual perspectives, which
can (in "the long run") be coordinated but never subsumed. Whatever judg
ments are reached, they will always be part of a story which is aware of its
provisionality, its "as if' character, its status as warranted assertion rather
than truth - its vulnerability to the "not yet" of truth. In CPI, philosophy is
continually under reconstruction. The elements of philosophical wonder body, mind, one and many, time, ego and reflexivity, the other, thought and

reality, nature and culture, and so on - cannot escape their contextualiza
tion either in the lived experience of community or in the event of
dialogue, in which the imperative of otherness and response is always

present.
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Children's Philosophical Capacities

One may well ask whether - assuming that doing "real" philosoph
way is possible at all - it is possible among children. A first ques
whether children entertain or are capable of entertaining philoso
ideas. One obvious answer to this doubt is Wordworth's (1924) ch
ization of children - or at least young children - as "best philoso
holders of "obstinate questionings of sense and outward things"
196). Gareth Matthews has explored this perennial philosophy o
hood in Philosophy and the Young Child (1980), and Bachelard (19
made of it a human archetype of the unconscious in his notion
"nucleus of childhood." There are many testimonies, both in mem
adult observation of children, to an experience of wonder in child
which the questions that later become the founding questions fo
philosophers are present as fundamental responses to lived expe
Matthews (1994) suggests that the adult philosopher is a philoso
precisely because she "locates the questioning child" in herself, re

to the "naively profound" questions of childhood (37, 40). Nor is ther

obvious reason why there should not be such a felt noetic cont
between child and adult. A more nuanced answer might suggest t

dren, to the extent to which they are capable of internalizing and re

ing adult language-games, are capable of generating philoso

questions. Philosophical discourse is a kind of subjective and inte
tive behavior. Wittgenstein (1972) asks: "But is it wrong to say 'A
that has mastered a language-game must know certain things'? If

of that one said 'must be able to do certain things,' that wou

pleonasm, yet this is just what I want to counter the first sentence w

(71e).
A second question is whether children are capable of bringing
lived philosophical questions into language, which in turn presup
level of reflection, or what is currently referred to as "metacogn

that is, the ability to isolate and frame the questions as indexes of co

tual structures to which a response is possible or desirable. How
account squares with studies in cognitive development - the epige

noetic structures, the development of a "theory of mind," or of the
to "decenter" and entertain more than one perspective at a time, and

- is a developmental and an educational question, which Philosop

Children attempts not so much to answer as to explore. A

Wittgenstein offers us the possibility of understanding philosop
language-game learned ostensively, which can be participated in o

levels. It is the claim of practitioners of Philosophy for Children tha
moves of the language-game of philosophy - moves like offering
uating categorical statements, exemplifying, and reasoning syllogisti

analogically, and conditionally - are implicit in the semantic and

cal structures of language, and therefore always implicit among thos
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use language.7 If this is the case, then to the extent that children shar
linguistic universe with adults, they share the capacity for at least som

the critical moves of philosophical dialogue, on some level. Childre
introduced to the language-game of philosophy in the same way the
introduced to the language-games of science, or art criticism, or cu
geography: "Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs

etc., etc. - they learn to fetch books, sit in armchairs, etc.,

(Wittgenstein 1972, 62e).

A third question is whether children are capable of building and sust
ing the dialectical interplay of ideas which characterizes CPI. Again, to
extent that the unfolding of the larger dynamic conceptual structures

CPI is an event of language - in the rich sense articulated by Gadam
language as medium, world, tradition, and event (1975, 345^47) -

group of individuals which participates in discourse is already equipped

some degree to participate in its larger conceptual patternings. T
extent that children are speakers and listeners - which already imp

level of reflection - they are as liable to the semiotic and conceptual pl

of dialogue as are adults. And it must be pointed out that the eme

structure of argument in CPI is often ambiguous and difficult to delin

even for skilled adults. In CPI, summarizing or locating the argume

itself a move within the argument.
If these three questions can be answered affirmatively, and corroborate
the experience of adults who take the time and effort to actually engage
dren in communal philosophical dialogue, one must wonder why those m
philosophers who have taken the trouble to comment on children's abilit

reason (much less philosophize) have been so conservative. Plato (1
1961) grouped children with women, slaves, and the "inferior multi

(1941, 125), all of whom he judged to be congenitally liable to a structu
imbalance in the three orders of the soul - reason, passion, and appetite
"boy, ... just because he more than any other has a fount of intelligenc
him which has not yet 'run clear,'... is the craftiest, most mischievous,

unruliest of brutes. So the creature must be held in check" (1961, 1
Reason, which is always the "smallest part," yet which must someho

empowered to rule the two others, is apparently only a product of male
hood. Children's only redeeming virtue is that they are "easily molded,"
is, they can be made into adults. Aristotle concurs: the preponderance of
appetitive nature in children either leads to or is a result of the lack of
capacity to choose (1987, 104), or moral agency, that is, the ability to d
erately engage in an action toward a final end, of "some kind of the activ
of the soul in conformity with virtue" (1962,22). In this sense children c
be called "happy" (1962, 23), for they are similar to women and slaves, w
have the capacity for moral agency, but not the power to exercise it.

7 The Whorfian Hypothesis forces me to limit this claim to languages with a su
predicate structure and use of the verb "be" equivalent to English.
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Children and the Politics of Rationality
There is a polar opposite to this negative view of children's capacity,

I have already referred to in its early nineteenth-century incarna

Romanticism. Children have consistently been associated with the tra
tional, and they figure as paradoxical exemplars in most wisdom trad
from the Tao Te Ching, to the New Testament, to the Eleusinian Mys

(Kennedy 1993). This is an inversion of adult reason - often a subv

- perhaps in the Christian case, specifically against the Greek
Children are exemplars of a critique of a narrow, rationalistic v

reason. This doesn't argue very well for the claim that children are ju
inherently reasonable within their context as adults, but it does chall
the idea that there is one ideal form of reason - the rationalistic logi

of the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, at least as the latter gets h
down into modern European philosophy.8 The critique of Western

that children represent also harmonizes with the great subtext of Soc
dialogue, which dramatizes the foundering of reason on the aporia, an

ironic discrediting of teleological dialogue as anything but a tot

ideal.

I would suggest that the systematic devaluation of children's capaci
reason has at least something to do with the Western construction of

and the reasonable, and by implication with the politics of ration

Crudely put, Western reason in its Platonic-Aristotelian roots is sym

cal with the sociopolitics of the Indo-European, patriarchal warrio
which is based - seen through the lens of contemporary sociop
anyway - on domination through separation and exclusion. In s
sociopolitics, children join women and the enslaved as an oppress
and are subjected to similar shadow-attributions by their oppress
irrationality, concupiscence, moral turpitude, and overemotionalis

shadow-attribution casts, in turn, a "light" which is represented by th

rational ideal of the wisdom traditions, in which the child (and
mystery religions, woman) is understood as unconscious master,
tary teacher, and psychopomp of a form of knowledge which ove
separation and exclusion through a unified form of knowing. Th

symbolizes consciousness before the subject-object division
prophetic of a restoration of subject-object unity - or, as Co

construed it, "the flow of a shared life between the elemental pol
mind and nature" (Abrams 1971, 277) - arrived at through the
mental journey of adult experience.
One aspect of postmodern epistemologies has been the unravel
the Western reduction of reason to a narrow rationalism. This un

8 I realize that the Greek nous is a concept that includes what we would now
transrational, but I am concerned primarily with its narrowed interpretation in the

Western reason.
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can be attributed at least in part to the accelerating advance of techn

of communication in our century, which has tended to unify the
information environment on a planetary scale, and thus to confr
West with multiple images of reason. Western reason's dialogue with
radical alterity began in Romantic epistemologies like Coleridge
Schiller's. It emerged at the turn of our century in art and psychoan

and it is significant that children were its interlocutors from the beg
- in Freud and in Jung and Kerenyi (1963); in Klee, Miro, and their g
ation of painters (Fineberg 1997); and in the kind of thinking repres

by Heinz Werner's (1948) influential comparative epistemology

child, the "primitive," and the insane. From early on, the child was a

icant figure in what Merleau-Ponty (1964b) described as "the task

century" - "the attempt to explore the irrational and integrate it int

expanded reason" (63).
How can the claim that children are capable of participating
language-game of philosophy be reconciled with the notion tha

represent an other to the very form of reason which that languagerepresents? But it is not the basic moves of Socratic dialectic to whic

dren are other, for those moves are dialogical and rooted in langu
discourse. Rather, it is the structures of power and privilege wh
dialectic serves in the hands of age, race, gender, and class to wh
dren are other. As feminist "standpoint epistemology" argues, w
know and how we know it are determined in some degree by the con
of social power which we experience (Harding 1991). When ther
conditions of domination, the dominated are marginalized by the
tor's personal, interpersonal, and social constructs. To the extent tha
colonized by Eurocentric patriarchy - women, persons of color, child

live at the margins of the adult white male construction of knowledge
relationship to that construct is always potentially transgressive. Onc

construct comes into question - as it has in our century - these "v
'strangers' to the social order," or "outsiders within," are recogn

carrying an "epistemic privilege" as a result of their location in the s
and natural world. Since they are not "natives" to the dominant cultu
is assumed that not only do they not see things that natives do, but al

they see things which natives don't (Harding 1991, 124, 131).
What do children see, or might they see, which the natives don't?

is their epistemic privilege? Whatever it is, it is not a content an

particular philosophy of this or that. Piaget's attribution, 'for examp
"nominal realism" to young children is not a great deal more inform

than the same attribution to any adult who has not yet engaged i
sophical reflection. The adult's naive position might be different
she has had a different amount of experience of the world and
language and world interact, but the position will be based on th
inductive and deductive processes.
I would suggest that the child as "valuable stranger" or "outsi
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within" has to do with her location within both the human life-world a

the human life cycle, which differs from the Eurocentric or white m

class adult male location. The difference has to do with the inter
boundaries, foci, and filters which any epistemological tradition Gadamer's (1975) term, "prejudice" - constructs in all the availabl
of interpreting the world and the way the world works. For ex
because she has just begun the life cycle and does not have a fund

mented knowledge, the young child is a comparative stranger to the s

subject-object or knower-known dualism of modern mainstream W
epistemology. This would make her at least potentially available
kinds of information which that tradition does not or cannot rec
Although it seems to be true that the subject-object style of a cul
assimilated very early in life, the child has not built up a solidl

mented implicit belief system - based on an interwoven mixture of s

acquired knowledge and generalization from experience - to the e

that adults have. She has not yet learned to ignore or interpret unilat

information which challenges hegemonic, socially mediated schem
difference from adults was taken up in the first half of the cent
Piaget (1929) and Werner (1948), both of whom drew heavily on

Bruhl's (1926) inquiry into "primitive" epistemology (Werne

compared children's thinking to that of the mentally ill) and his noti

"participation mystique," or an interactive subject-object - or su
subject - relation, which is not present in the strict Western em

causal framework.

The lived world of the modern, Western adult is, in its normal function,

what Alfred Schutz called a "wide-awake" world. It is an object- and a
person-world oriented to getting things done - a tool world, in which all
tacit knowledge is arrayed in the service of the instrument and the purpose

for which the instrument is wielded. It requires a stylized demarcation

between the inner world of feeling and intuition and the world of objects
and tasks. It is the world of the metaphorical "expert" - who, according to

Schutz (1970),

is at home only in a system of imposed relevances - imposed, that is, by the
problems pre-established within his field. Or to be more precise, by his deci
sion to become an expert he has accepted the relevances imposed within his
field as the intrinsic, and the only intrinsic, relevances of his acting and think
ing. But his field is rigidly limiting. .. . The expert starts from the assumption
not only that the system of problems established within his field is relevant but
that it is the only relevant system. All his knowledge is referred to this frame of
reference which has been established once and for all. He who does not accept
it as the monopolized system of his intrinsic relevances does not share with the

expert a universe of discourse. (241-42)

There are other realities and their corresponding universes of discourse:
"the world of dreams, of imageries and phantasms, especially the world of
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art, the world of religious experience, the world of scientific con

tion, the play world of the child, and the world of the insane" (Schutz
232). Each could be characterized as embodying a different subject-ob
or self-world relation, whether the self's interlocutor is animate or inani

mate - which in itself is a judgment based on a culturally mediated way of

categorizing the world. Schutz calls these realities "finite provinces of
meaning," and argues that each has a specific "cognitive style" or "tension

of consciousness" and that they are incommensurable: "There is no possi
bility of referring one of these provinces to the other by introducing a
formula of transformation. The passing from one to the other can only be

performed by a 'leap' . . . which manifests itself in the subjective experi
ence of a shock" (1973, 233). I would suggest that what distinguishes the
child from the adult is that the child is not an "expert" of the everyday
world of the "wide awake," and therefore she does not inhabit any one
"monopolized system of intrinsic relevances" - which gives the child what

Dewey (1916) calls her "plasticity," or "the pliable elasticity by which

some persons take on the color of their surroundings while retaining their

own bent" (44). Similarly, Merleau-Ponty (1964a) describes the child as a
"polymorph." "We must," he says, "conceive of the child not as an absolute
other, nor as the same as us, but as a polymorph.. . . The child, not yet inte
grated into our [adult] culture, can exhibit forms of conduct which remind
us of certain pathological or primitive conduct. . . . But there are not three

comparable prelogical mentalities" (111, my translation).
As polymorphs, children do not leap between different tensions of
consciousness so much as vacillate, or glide, through "taking the color of
their surroundings." This is a cognitive style characterized by the subject
object relation which Winnicott, in Playing and Reality (1971), calls "tran

sitional" - more a field than a polarity, "spread out over the whole

intermediate territory between 'inner psychic reality' and 'external world

as perceived by two persons in common,' that is to say, over the whole
cultural field" (5). It is the intersubjective location where relations are

worked out between primary and secondary process, the subjectively felt
and the objectively perceived. Winnicott called it an "intermediate area of
experiencing, to which inner reality and external life both contribute" (88).

He considered it an essential moment in the development of the child's
relations between self and other, particularly of the ability to recognize the

other, "not as a projection [or, as he calls it elsewhere, a 'subjective

object'], but as a thing in itself," and therefore as "outside the area of the

subject's omnipotent control" (89). That is, it is the psychological space
which offers us the possibility of the "withdrawal of projection" spoken of

in psychoanalysis, which is analogous to Levinas's notion of recognition
of the uniqueness and irreplaceableness of the other, or Buber's "Thou."
Through the negotiation of this intermediate space, the other is "found
instead of placed by the subject in the world" (94). This is the space of
dialogue, or at least of the conditions for dialogue.
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It is also the space of play. According to Winnicott, "playing has
and a time. It is not inside by any use of the word. . . . Nor is it out
is to say, it is not a part of the repudiated world, the not-me, that

individual has decided to recognize ... as truly external, which
magical control" (41). The child is a native of the "between" of

that realm where the players are played by the play, the precariou
that is outside the individual but is not the external world, which

associates with the event of understanding, and which Silverm

refers to as "the space of difference which is neither that of the su
that of the object" (89). Winnicott argues that this is also the space
creativity, of the "intense experiencing that belongs to the arts an

gion and to imaginative living, and to creative scientific work
adds elsewhere, to philosophy (14). It is the space of inquiry,
Silverman calls "interrogation," a

field in which questioning takes priority, where the answers are locate
in the questioner, nor in that which is questioned. In both cases, inte
and interrogation happen in the space of difference where the prod
discursive meaning is decentered and praxical. Their task is to raise
rather than to answer them, to ask about rather than conclude for, t
place where positions can occur rather than speak from positions. (88

Being a polymorph, the child is by no means a master of this re

an expert, but simply a native. The adult, in becoming an expe
specialized epistemologies of his culture, his epoch, his class,

gender, is no longer a native of this reality. But the transitional is

inal space of philosophy, the space called "wonder," invoke

Romantics as being peculiar to childhood, the space of dialogue

and, in the thought of Gadamer and Silverman, the space of herm

in which the subject is displaced through entering the "betw

reason that children have been made strangers is that this reality

to the transcendental ego of Cartesian and Kantian subjectivity
modern project, to the extent that it involves the "death" of th
subject, is a deconstruction of the transcendental ego and a search
"between" - an inquiry into the topography of a subject whose bou
are no longer assumed.
Given the child's alternative reality, her importance to this proj

seem to follow - as has the importance to it of other cultures and o
Its implications for the Western philosophical tradition are analog
implications for Christianity of the opening of the West to other
traditions. One of its effects is to subvert the myth of the progres
ical evolution of epistemological frameworks that is so perfectly e

in Comte's stage theory - which, combined with recapitu

("ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny"), traps the child (as, in their

evolutionary theories trapped the colonial "native") at a lowe
development of the species. A pluralistic epistemology deconst
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such hierarchy. In a relatively pluralistic, decentered culture such as post
modernism aspires to be, the child is suddenly more visible, and her half

socialized epistemological universe assumes value, because of her very
facility at crossing the lines which are heavily demarcated in the adult

economy of provinces of meaning. She can float between frameworks.
As the child of the Romantics is prophetic of a unity of being and know

ing which becomes a developmental task for the adult, the child of post

modernism is prophetic of that "expanded reason" announced by

Merleau-Ponty, in the form of a pluralism of "tensions of consciousness"
and the ability to negotiate them. What this means for adults doing philos
ophy with children is that it becomes a mutual pedagogy. Adults learn from
being present as children learn the language-game of Socratic dialectic. In
learning this language-game, children see how language and thought cross
and recross each other - they play in their chiasmic relation. In teaching it,
adults observe the ambiguous line between the spontaneous emergence of
dialectical thinking through language and cognitive interaction, and its

reification as "a system of imposed relevances," that is, a socialized

language-game.
The value of the marginalized voice is to open a space for deconstruc
tion and critical reconstruction of the tradition. What distinguishes
Philosophy for Children from other such attempts is that in CPI, philoso
phy becomes an oral event-structure rather than a literate text-structure - it
reenters time. In the language event of CPI, the conceptual "problems" of

the tradition - truth, knowledge, justice, mind, and so on - are rein

vented/rediscovered in the process of communal dialogical discourse. This
creates a space for reconstruction of the tradition in its lived, contempora

neous form - as it exists now in human thought, culture, and social life.
Philosophy is once again understood as the conversation about how we are

to live, and truth as an ongoing, historical construction about the same
questions humans have always asked. As Socratic dialogue as transcribed

by Plato inaugurates the end of oral and the beginning of literate discourse,

so CPI inaugurates a dialectical reconstruction of postliterate oral

discourse. This return to the agora reinvents philosophy as an ongoing
conversation about inherently contestable concepts, not a proto-theology
or a proto-science. Although children have been excluded from this
conversation, they have never been far from it. Adults have always heard
their voices at the margins - Augustine on the other side of the garden wall,
or Lao-Tzu in the presence of the master - and as the margins shift, their
voices shift and reason shifts. Enriched, the conversation continues.
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